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INTRODUCTION

On June 1, 2008, Illinois wine enthusiasts woke up to find that out-ofstate wine retailers could no longer ship their wines to Illinois residents.'
The Illinois General Assembly created a winery shiper's license for which
only wine producers or manufacturers could apply. The Act also repealed
existing law under which out-of-state retailers could ship wine to Illinois
residents since 1992.' Through the passage of this Act, the Illinois legislature responded to emerging online markets and the United States Supreme
Court case Granholm v. Heald.4 Like other state legislatures,5 Illinois
sought to restrict out-of-state retailers from shipping to Illinois residents,
while allowing in-state retailers to continue to do the same. 6
Granholm v. Heald was a watershed ruling for the direct-shipment
wine industry. The Supreme Court held that states could not allow in-state
wineries to ship to consumers within the state's jurisdiction while enjoining
out-of-state wineries from doing the same.7 The Supreme Court ruled that
the Twenty-first Amendment does not abrogate the antidiscriminatory mandate of the dormant Commerce Clause. Through this decision, the Supreme
1. Compare 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-29 (2006), amended by Act of Oct. 3, 2007,
Pub. Act 95-634, 2007 I11.Legis. Serv. 5803 (West) (allowing licensed individuals to ship to
Illinois residents from states that afford "equal reciprocal shipping privilege[s]"), with 235
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-29 (2006 & Supp. 2008) (creating a shipping license for only wine
manufacturers but not distributors or retailers); see also discussion infra Part III.A.
2.
235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-19(r) (2006), amended by Act of Oct. 3, 2007, Pub.
Act 95-634, 2007 Ill. Legis. Serv. 5803, 5815 (West).
A winery shipper's license shall allow a person with a first-class or second-class wine manufacturer's license, a first-class or second-class winemaker's license, or a limited wine manufacturer's license or who is licensed to make wine under the laws of another state to ship wine made
by that licensee directly to a resident of this State who is 21 years of age
or older for that resident's personal use and not for resale.
Id.
3. 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-29 (2006), amended by Act of Oct. 3, 2007, Pub. Act
95-634, 2007 Ill. Legis. Serv. 5803 (West). Illinois had previously been a reciprocity state.
For a discussion of reciprocity laws, see infra Part II.A.
4.
Act of Oct. 3, 2007, Pub. Act 95-634, 2007 Ill. Legis. Serv. 5803, 5815 (West);
Jane Firstenfeld, Illinois Opens to Direct Shipping, WINES & VINES, May 7, 2008,
http://www.winesandvines.com/template.cftn?section=news&content-55364#.
5. See discussion infra Part III.B.
6.
Press Release, I11.Liquor Control Comm'n Indus. Educ. Div., New License
Required to Ship Wine Directly into Illinois (May 6, 2008), http://www.state.il.us/lcc/PR0506-08.asp ("Holders of a State of Illinois Retailer's Liquor License will continue to be allowed to ship product to Illinois residents ....
[O]ut-of-state retailers are prohibited from
shipping alcoholic liquor directly to Illinois consumers.").
7. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 493 (2005).
8. Id. at 460.
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Court overruled Michigan and New York statutory schemes that gave pref9
erential treatment to in-state wineries over their out-of-state competitors.
Since Granholm, both Michigan and New York have revised their liquor codes. While curing the discriminatory impact between in-state and outof-state wineries,' ° the new Michigan and New York laws created another
constitutional conundrum. Under Michigan and New York's new scheme,
in-state retailers can directly ship their wine to residents within their respective jurisdictions but out-of-state retailers cannot." Since the adoption of
these new laws, both Michigan and New York laws have seen judicial scrutiny with opposite results: the United States District Court in Michigan held
Michigan's statutory scheme to be unconstitutional and a violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause as the law discriminated against out-of-state
wineries over in-state wineries.' 2 The United States District Court in New
York upheld New York's similar statutory scheme but did not reach the
dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 3
Part Four of this Comment addresses the dormant Commerce Clause
issues that stem from Illinois, Michigan, and New York alcohol statutory
schemes. This Comment will argue that allowing in-state retailers to ship to
consumers while enjoining out-of-state retailers from doing the same is a
valid exercise of state power under the Twenty-first Amendment. 14 This
Comment further argues that the antidiscriminatory mandate of the dormant
Commerce Clause of the Constitution 5 does not prevent this conclusion.

II.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

RISE OF THE THREE-TIER SYSTEM AND RECIPROCITY LAWS AND THE
INTERESTS THESE LAWS EFFECTUATE

16
Alcohol has long held a special place in American jurisprudence.
Justice Robert H. Jackson once deemed alcohol to be lawlessness unto it-8
self.' 7 In the early twentieth century, a movement toward temperance

9.
Id.
10.
The new Michigan and New York laws allow both in-state and out-of-state
wineries to ship to residents within their respective jurisdictions. See discussion infra Part
III.B.
11.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
12.
Siesta Viii. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1044 (E.D. Mich.
2008).
13.
Arnold Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
14.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
15.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 3.
16.
Alcohol is the subject of two amendments to the Constitution: the Eighteenth
Amendment and the Twenty-first Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII; U.S. CONST.
amend. XXI.
17.
Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 398 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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sought to restrict the sale of alcohol within the states.' 9 The temperance
movement associated drinking with vice, risk to young women, and the fall
of youthful purity. 20 Because of pressure from this movement,
21 many states
began outlawing the sale and manufacture of alcohol entirely.
1.

The Temperance Movement TowardNationalizedProhibition

The temperance movement sought prohibition as a remedy to the ills
that alcohol brought upon society. 22 The movement had early success enjoining the sale of alcoholic beverages in local and state jurisdictions.23 As
these laws were frustrated by judicial use of the Commerce Clause,24 the
Eighteenth Amendment was seen as essential to establishing the movement's goals.25
The United States Supreme Court invalidated laws that barred the
transportation of liquors into "dry" territories.26 In response to these court
rulings, Congress passed the Wilson Act of 189027 and the Webb-Kenyon
Act of 1913, which enabled states to regulate alcohol transported into their

18.

beverages)."

Temperance is "restrained or moderate indulgence (esp[ecially] of alcoholic
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1504 (8th ed. 2004).

19.
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005).
20. PERRY R. DuIs, THE SALOON PUBLIC DRINKING IN CHICAGO AND BOSTON 18801920, at 275 (1983).
21.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476. At that time, the Supreme Court upheld bans on the
sale and manufacture of alcohol. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
22. Thomas E. Rutledge & Micah C. Daniels, Who's Selling the Next Round: Wines,
State Lines, the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause, 33 N. KY. L. REv. 1, 810 (2006).
23.
Mihir A. Munshi, Share the Wine-Liquor Control in Pennsylvania, 58 U. PIrr.
L. REv. 507, 509 (1997).
24. The Rhodes decision allowed the mail-order liquor business to thrive because
states could not ban the sale of imported liquor. Arnold Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp.
2d 401, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476).
25.
Rutledge & Daniels, supra note 22, at 9.
26. See Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898) (holding Iowa code that makes transportation of intoxicating liquors into Iowa jurisdiction unlawful was unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) (holding an Iowa law
invalid under the Commerce Clause as it prohibited the sale of liquor by an importer in the
original package), superseded by statute, Wilson Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified
at 27 U.S.C. 121 (2006)), as recognized in Granholm, 544 U.S. 460.
27. Wilson Act, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2006)) ("[A]I
fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors transported into any State or Territory...
shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws
of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers."). The United States
Supreme Court later recognized the Wilson Act as constitutional. Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140
U.S. 545 (1891).
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jurisdictions.28 These acts gave the states enormous power to regulate the
interstate flow of alcohol.29
Much of these early controversies regarding the delivery of alcohol
were extinguished when the temperance movement successfully persuaded
the states to adopt the Eighteenth Amendment. 30 The prohibition movement
won over public acceptance, and the Eighteenth Amendment enshrined
prohibitionist distaste of alcohol in the Constitution. 3' This prohibitionist
victory would only last thirteen years.32
2.

Early Illinois Jurisprudenceon the Delivery ofAlcohol

In Illinois, the law has often been at odds with the public's desire for
intoxicating beverages.33 As the dangers of drinking grew on the public
consciousness, local Illinois jurisdictions began outlawing the sale of liquor
and went "dry. Dry counties led to some of the earliest jurisprudence on
the subject of the shipping of alcohol.35
Early Illinois prohibitionist efforts were often stymied by Illinois law
regulating delivery of alcohol. 36 Irritating the efforts of anti-saloon and dry
territories, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that municipalities could not
37
use municipal boundaries as barriers to the trade of alcoholic products.
28. Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 122
(2006)) ("[T]he shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means whatsoever, of
any spirituousm, vinous, malted, fermented, or other intoxicating liquor of any kind, from
one State, Territory, or District of the United States ...to be received, possessed, sold, or in
any manner used... in violation of any law of such State, Territory, or District of the United
States ...is prohibited.").
29. Mike Figge, Case Note, Granhoim v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005), 8 Wyo.
L. REV. 231, 237 (2008).
30. Michael A. Pasahow, Note, Granholm v. Heald: Shifting the Boundaries of
California Reciprocal Wine Shipping, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 569, 572 (2006). While
alcohol was taken out of the hands of state legislatures by the Eighteenth Amendment, taking alcohol out of the hands of Americans proved to be more difficult. Despite the constitutional ban on alcohol, Americans obtained their spirits through "home distillers, 'rum runners,' [and] physicians." Rutledge & Daniels, supranote 22, at 9.
31.
See Rutledge & Daniels, supra note 22, at 8.
32. The Eighteenth Amendment was ratified by North Carolina on January 16,
1919. Thirteen years later, on December 5, 1933, the Twenty-first Amendment repealed the
Eighteenth Amendment. Andre Nance, Note, Don't Put a Cork in Granholm v. Heald: New
York's Ban on InterstateDirect Shipments of Wine is Unconstitutional,16 J.L. & POL'Y 925,
925 n. 1(2008).
33.
See Duis, supranote 20, at 211-20.
34. Id.at 211-12.
35. See People v. Young, 86 N.E. 589 (Ill. 1908); Kiel v. City of Chicago, 52 N.E.
29 (Ill. 1898).
36. See Duis,supra note 20, at 220-21.
37. Kiel, 52 N.E. at 30.
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Cities like Evanston 38 and Georgetown attempted to keep the evils of alcohol out of their jurisdictions by prohibiting the sale of alcohol. 39 Residents
within these dry territories-undeterred by local antisaloon ordinanceswould order alcohol from neighboring "wet" territories and have the alcohol delivered into the dry territory.4 ° In Illinois v. Young, a Georgetown
resident phoned Young's saloon-located in the wet territory of Danvilleto order beer. 41 Young delivered the beer cash on delivery in Georgetowna "dry" territory-and was thereby prosecuted for violating Georgetown
antisaloon laws.42 The Illinois Supreme Court held that the actual sale was
conducted on the premises of Young's saloon in Danville.43 Since the sale
took place in Danville, a "wet" territory, and not Georgetown, Young's
saloon did not violate Georgetown's antisaloon laws. 44
Later with the passage of the Twenty-first Amendment, Illinois created
a three-tier 45 system with the passage of the Illinois Liquor Control Act of
1934 pursuant to the new power granted by Section 2 of the Twenty-first
Amendment. 46
3.

The Twenty-first Amendment and the Three-Tier System

After the states ratified the Twenty-first Amendment,47 the states
moved quickly to regulate the influx of alcoholic beverages. 48 Most states
adopted regulations that placed alcohol sales into a "three-tier" system.49
38.
When Northwestern University-a Methodist institution-was formed, the
Illinois General Assembly added a clause to their charter that prohibited the sale of liquor
within four miles of campus. Duis, supra note 20, at 211. Evanston's charter also included a
prohibition on the sale of liquor. Id. at 212.
39.
Young, 86 N.E. at 590. Jurisdictions that prohibited the sale of alcohol were
called "antisaloon" or "dry" territories. See id.
40.
Duis, supra note 20, at 220 (noting that "Call before 11 and delivery before 5"
was common in alcohol advertising of the time).
41.
Young, 86 N.E. at 590.
42. Id.
43.
Id.
44. Id. at 591 ("So far as the question of delivery between the seller and purchaser is
concerned, this case is exactly as though [the Georgetown resident], being in Danville township, had received the beer from the brewing company, and had then himself hauled or carried it into Georgetown.").
45.
For a discussion of the three-tier system, see discussion infra Part I.A.3.
46. Illinois Liquor Control Act of 1934, 1933-1934 II1. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 57
(codified as amended at 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1 (2006 & Supp. 2008)).
47.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
48.
Alan E. Wiseman & Jerry Ellig, Market and Nonmarket Barriers to Internet
Wine Sales: The Case of Virginia, Bus. & POL., Oct. 2004, at 1, 2,
http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol6/iss2/art4/.
49. Id. at 2.
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Under the three-tier system, "all alcohol coming into the state would have
to come from the producer (tier one) to a distributor (tier two) and finally to
a retailer (tier three) before arriving in the hands of any potential consumers."5 ° Vertical integration-in which entities occupy more than one place
wine
within the three-tier system51-is generally prohibited. 52 Today, "most
53
system."
three-tier
the
through
distributed
is
States]
United
[in the
In 1986, California passed the first "reciprocity" laws allowing for the
direct shipment of wine.54 California's reciprocity law "prohibit[ed] the
direct shipment of wine from other states to California residents unless the
originating state allowed California wineries to directly ship to that state's
residents." 55 The legislature intended to encourage other states to adopt
reciprocal wine shipping privileges in other states "for purposes of improving fairness and equity for the small, family vintners and winegrowers of
California. '' 56 Fifteen years later, thirteen states had adopted reciprocity
laws, including Illinois.57
Today, most states have some form of limited permit systems for wineries to ship their wares directly to consumers.58 Permit states allow out-ofstate wineries and retailers to ship wines to in-state consumers subject to
various restrictions. 59 For example, the Illinois permit system requires fees
50. Id.
51.
Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1106 (lth Cir. 2002). The three-tier
system "requires three vertical layers of distribution (manufacturer, distributor, and vendor)
and mandates that no layer in the vertical hierarchy act in the capacity of another. For example, a manufacturer cannot act as a distributor or retailer." Id. (citation omitted).
52.

FED. TRADE COMM'N, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE:

WINE 5 (2003), availableat http://www.fic.gov/os/2003/07winereport2.pdf [hereinafter FTC
REPORT].

Id.
53.
54.
Gina M. Riekhof & Michael E. Sykuta, Regulating Wine by Mail, REGULATION,
Fall 2004, at 30, availableat http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv27n3/v27n3-3.pdf.
Gina M. Riekhof & Michael E. Sykuta, Politics, Economics and the Regulation
55.
of Direct Interstate Shipping in the Wine Industry 2 (Apr. 15 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-481947. California's reciprocity law read as
follows: "[A]n individual or licensee in a state that affords California licensees or individuals an equal reciprocal shipping privilege, may ship, for personal use and not for resale, no
more than two cases of wine ...per month to any adult resident in this state." CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §23661.2 (1997), amended by 2005 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1737 (West). California
has since changed to a permit state. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §23661.2 (Supp. 2008). For a

discussion of permit systems, see discussion infra Part I.A.3.
56. Act of Aug. 31, 1994, ch. 394, § 3, 1994 Cal. Stat. 2249.
Riekhof & Sykuta, supra note 54, at 32.
57.
Map,
Shipping
Direct
Institute,
58.
Wine
http://wineinstitute.shipcompliant.com/Home.aspx?SaleTypelD=l (last visited Apr. 26,
2010). At the time of this writing, thirteen states do not allow direct shipping of wine to
residents of their jurisdiction. Id.
FTC REPORT, supra note 52, at 8. These restrictions are generally in the form of
59.
fees and taxes. See id.
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ranging from one hundred fifty to one thousand dollars depending on the
size of the winery.6 °
Through these liquor distribution schemes, states attempt to promote
several interests. The states regulate the distribution to keep alcohol out of
minors' hands, facilitate tax collection, and prevent organized crime. 6' The
ease of access of the Internet to youths makes states wary of direct sales of
alcohol through the Internet. 62 Through their liquor distribution system,
states seek to ensure alcohol sold within their jurisdiction is properly
taxed.63
B.

THE INTERNET'S INFLUENCE ON THE DIRECT SHIPMENT OF WINE

The Internet has become an important market for small wineries to sell
their wines. Demand for "individualistic, hand-crafted wine" has risen. 64 In
response, the number of small wineries has increased significantly.65 In
1975, small wineries in the United States numbered between five and eight
hundred; today, the number of small wineries is over two thousand.66 The
Internet offers both consumers and small wineries the opportunity of lower
prices and greater availability. 67 Between 1994 and 1999, the online sale of
wine doubled-resulting in a $500 million market.6 8 Some estimates have
online wine sales occupying between five and ten percent of the total wine
market within a few years.69

60.
235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-3 (2006 & Supp. 2008).
61.
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005); Figge, supra note 29, at 256-57.
62.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. Justice Kennedy's opinion rejected this justification
of discriminatory laws for two reasons. Id. at 490. First, Justice Kennedy noted that the
states had little evidence to support their assertion that online direct sales contributed to
underage drinking. Id. at 489-90. Second, Justice Kennedy also noted that if minors were
using the Internet to obtain alcohol, minors could easily order from in-state, online retailers
and wineries rather than from out-of-state entities. Id.
63.
Id. at 489. Although the American regulation of alcohol is intricate, Europe and
France also strictly regulate wine production and distribution. See Antoine Vialard, Regulating Quality Wines in European and French Law, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 235 (Daniel S. Reynolds trans., 1999).
64.
FTC REPORT, supra note 52, at 6.
Id.
65.
66.
Id.
67.
Alan E. Wiseman and Jerry Ellig compared the availability and price of wine
found online with those of McLean, Virginia, which prohibited direct shipping of wine.
Wiseman & Ellig, supra note 48, at 28. The results of the study found that consumers could
save a significant amount of money from online sales when compared to those available at a
bricks-and-mortar store. Id. They also found that fifteen percent of those products found
online were unavailable within the jurisdiction of McLean, Virginia. Id.
68.
FTC REPORT, supra note 52, at 5.
69.
Id.
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The three-tier system is a barrier for many small wineries to get their
products to consumers. For small wineries, distribution through the threetier system often means a wholesale mark-up that makes the three-tier distribution economically infeasible.70 Wine shipped through the three-tier
system has to pass through in-state wholesalers and in-state retailers before
reaching consumers.7 These two extra layers price many small wineries out
of numerous state markets. 72 Small wineries also encounter problems finding wholesalers to even carry their products because small wineries produce
smaller quantities.7 3
In addition to smaller wineries, wine retailers have found success on
the Internet as a medium to reach wine consumers. Websites such as
Wine.Woot.com, 74 Wine.com,

75

and Wine Library 76 have sprung up to take

advantage of the new market created by the Internet. Even established online retailers not in the alcohol business are looking to take part in the growing online wine market.77
The growing online market is colliding with the old, established legal
system of alcohol distribution. The patchwork of state distribution systems
have led to frequent legal challenges to the barriers impeding the direct sale
70. In Granholm, one of the petitioners, Domane Aired, was a small Californian
winery in San Luis Obispo that produced 3000 cases of wine per year. Granholm v. Heald,
544 U.S. 460, 468 (2005). The winery argued that even if they were to enter their wine into
the Michigan market through the three-tier system, their wines would be priced out of reach
of their would-be consumers. Id.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 474.
71.
72. Id.

73.

FTC REPORT, supranote 52, at 6.

74. Woot.Wine.com offers a group of wines from a single winery located within the
United States three times a week. Wine.Woot: What is Wine.Woot?,
http://wine.woot.com/WhatIsWoot.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2010). Woot.Wine.com is
unusual because Woot.Wine.com does not handle any of the wine they sell. Id. Instead,
Woot.Wine.com acts as an agent between the customer and the winery. Id. For all sales, the
winery is the seller of record rather than Woot.Wine.com. Id. As long as the selling winery
has an Illinois winery shipper's license, this unusual set up allows Illinois consumers to buy
wine through Woot.Wine.com. See id.
Wine.com, a California online wine retailer, has created a network of ware75.
houses and retail operations in various states. Tim Teichgraeber, 'Storm' of Negative PR as
15
2008,
Jan.
DECANTER.COM,
on
Rivals,
Sneaks
Wine.com
http://www.decanter.com/news/174024.html. This network allows Wine.com to ship in
many states that would not otherwise be accessible. Id.
76. Wine Library started as a family-owned, New Jersey liquor store. Joel Stein,
2007,
28,
Jun.
TIME,
Uncorked,
Totally
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1638446,00.html. The proprietor, Gary
Vaynerchuk, took his father's liquor store and turned Wine Library into a multimillion dollar
online wine retailer. Id.
Howard G. Goldberg & Adam Lechmere, Amazon to Move into Wine,
77.
DECANTER.COM, Mar. 7, 2008, http://www.decanter.com/news/I 96662.html.
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of wine. 78 These legal challenges led to the watershed case Granholm v.
Heald,79 which addressed the growing conflict between the Twenty-first
Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause.8 °
C.

DIRECT SHIPPING LAW SINCE GRANHOLM V. HEALD

In 2005, the Supreme Court addressed whether states could allow instate wineries to ship to in-state consumers while banning out-of-state wineries from shipping to the same consumers. 8' Granholm consolidated two
separate cases regarding New York and Michigan direct shipping laws.
The Court first determined whether the New York and Michigan statutes
violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Then, the Court decided whether
the New York and Michigan statutes were saved by virtue of Section 2 of
the Twenty-first Amendment.8 3
While the mechanics differed, the intent of both the Michigan and
New York direct shipment schemes sought to allow in-state wineries to ship
directly to consumers while disallowing the same from out-of-state wineries. 84 Michigan law allowed in-state wineries to obtain a "wine maker" license, which allowed licensed in-state wineries to ship directly to Michigan
consumers and circumvent Michigan's three-tier system.8 5 Michigan law
did not allow out-of-state wineries to obtain a similar license and required
86
out-of-state wineries to distribute through Michigan's three-tier system.
New York law allowed wineries that produced wine made only from New
York grapes to obtain a license to ship directly to consumers. 87 Out-of-state
wineries could circumvent New York's three-tier system, but only if the
out-of-state winery became licensed as a New York winery by opening a
local branch in the state of New York.88
The Court's discussion regarding the discriminatory intent and effect
of Michigan and New York's law centered on the ability of similarlysituated alcohol producers to circumvent the local jurisdiction's three-tier
78.
Vanessa O'Connell, Wine Sales Thrive as Old Barriers Start to Fall,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 25, 2006, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06237/71636628.stm.
79.
544 U.S. 460 (2005).
80. See id.
81.
Id.
82.
Id. at 465.
83.
Id. at 476.
84.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 465-66.
85.
Id. at 469-70; Aaron Nielson, Recent Development, Good History, Good Law
(and by Coincidence Good Policy Too): Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005), 29
HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 743, 744 (2005).
86.
Nielson, supra note 85, at 744.
87.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 470.
88.
Id.
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system.8 9 Because of the dormant Commerce Clause, "state laws violate the
Commerce Clause if they mandate 'differential treatment of in-state and
out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the
latter."' 90 Justice Kennedy's reasoning on this point can be summed up by
this passage:
As relevant to today's cases ...

the three-tier system is...

mandated by Michigan and New York only for sales from
out-of-state wineries. In-state wineries, by contrast, can obtain a license for direct sales to consumers. The differential
treatment between in-state and out-of-state wineries consti91
tutes explicit discrimination against interstate commerce.
Michigan's law explicitly allowed in-state wineries to circumvent
Michigan's three-tier system while disallowing out-of-state wineries the
same advantage.9 2 New York's law was less obviously discriminatory than
Michigan's but still required out-of-state wineries to jump through far more
costly hoops to ship directly to consumers than in-state wineries.93 Justice
Kennedy noted that New York law provided in-state wineries preferential
access to consumers within New York. 94 Because the Michigan and New
York laws "deprive[d] citizens their right to have access to the markets of
other states on equal terms," the laws violated the Commerce Clause.95
The Court next turned to the Twenty-first Amendment to decide
whether Michigan and New York's legal schemes were saved by the mandate in Section 2.96 The Twenty-first Amendment provides explicit state
power over the transportation and importation of alcohol into their jurisdictions.97 The Court had to deal with the lengthy jurisprudence on the effect
has on the antidiscriminatory
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment
98
mandate of the Commerce Clause.

89.
Id.at 467-68.
Id.at 472 (citing Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99
90.
(1994)).
91.
Id.at 466-67.
92.
Granholm,544 U.S. at 473.
93.
Id.at 474. The Court also noted that New York's "regulatory gauntlet" provided
such a barrier to out-of-state wineries that none were licensed. Id.
Id.
94.
95.
Id.at 476.
96. Id.
97.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
98.
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution reads, "The Congress shall have
power ...To regulate commerce... among the several states." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
This has long been recognized to mean that the states cannot "erect barriers against interstate
trade." Rutledge & Daniels, supra note 22, at 4 (citing Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447
1
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Whether Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment was intended to
abrogate the antidiscrimination principle of the dormant Commerce Clause
has long been in controversy. 99 Justice Kennedy noted that the language of
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment "closely follows the WebbKenyon and Wilson Acts."' 00 Justice Kennedy then reasoned that the Supreme Court's interpretation of those Acts should guide the Courts interpretation of Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.' 0' The Court then declared that discrimination was not a privilege that the states enjoyed under
the Webb-Kenyon and Wilson Acts, and therefore, the states should not
enjoy the privilege
to discriminate pursuant to Section 2 of the Twenty-first
02
Amendment. 1
Using this analysis and a line of cases that support this reasoning, the
Court decided that the Twenty-first Amendment does not abrogate the
mandate against discrimination embodied in the dormant Commerce
Clause.10 3 Having concluded that discriminatory state laws are not saved by
the Twenty-first Amendment, the Supreme Court held the Michigan and
New York legal schemes unconstitutional.'°4

U.S. 27, 35 (1980)). This interpretation is known as the "dormant" Commerce Clause. Rutledge & Daniels, supra note 22, at 5.
99.
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the implications of the
Twenty-first Amendment, see Nielson, supra note 85, at 743-47, and Rutledge & Daniels,
supra note 22, at 8-22.
100.
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460,484 (2005).
101.
Id.
102.
Id.Justice Kennedy's reasoning is not unassailable. Justice Kennedy points to
several Supreme Court decisions that held the opposing view and dismisses them as they
"did not take account of [the history of the Twenty-first Amendment]." Id.Justice Stevens's
dissent argues that the Supreme Court's early jurisprudence on the Webb-Kenyon and Wilson Acts should not guide the Court's interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment. Id at
496-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because the Twenty-first Amendment is the only constitutional amendment to have been ratified "by the people in state conventions, rather than by
state legislatures," Justice Stevens reasons that the ordinary meaning of Twenty-first
Amendment should be given precedent over the Court's historical analysis of the WebbKenyon and Wilson Acts. Id.A question Justice Kennedy's analysis raises is why the people
in state conventions included the language of Section 2 in the amendment. Both WebbKenyon and Wilson Acts were good law at the time. 27 U.S.C. §§ 121-122 (2006). Since
both Acts were still good law, what was the purpose of enshrining the language of either Act
ina constitutional amendment?
103.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484.
104.
Id.
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III. CURRENT STATE SYSTEMS FOR THE DIRECT SHIPMENT OF WINE
A. THE NEW ILLINOIS LAW AND THE WINERY SHIPPER'S LICENSE

Illinois liquor law starts by disallowing all manufacture, transport, and
selling of intoxicating liquors without specific permission from the Illinois
Liquor Commission or as provided by law.'0 5 From this starting point, the
Illinois Liquor Control Act provides the Illinois Liquor Control Commission the ability to issue a variety of licenses. 10 6 These licenses allow businesses various positions within Illinois' three-tier system. 0 7 Illinois' threetier system follows the paradigm of manufacturer-distributor-retailer that
most jurisdictions adopt.
08
Illinois' first tier licenses a wide-range of alcohol manufacturers.1
These manufacturers are generally only allowed to sell to distributors or
out-of-state persons;' 0 9 Illinois, however, provides an exception for in-state
wine manufacturers. u 0 From the manufacturers, alcohol is then sold to licensed distributors or wholesalers, which occupy Illinois' second tier."'
Finally, in the third tier, licensed Illinois retailers buy from distributors and
sell the alcohol to consumers. 12
Illinois retailers are licensed to sell alcohol "only in the premises
specified in the license."' '3 Although the statute gives no specific authority
105.
235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1 (2006 & Supp. 2008) ("No person shall manufacture, bottle, blend, sell, barter, transport, transfer into this State from a point outside this
State, deliver, furnish or possess any alcoholic liquor for beverage purposes, unless such
person has been issued a license by the Commission ...or except as otherwise specifically
provided in this Act.").
106.
Id.
Id.
107.
108.
Id.The Illinois Liquor Control Commission licenses distillers, rectifiers, brewers, and wine-manufacturers. 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1(a) (2006 & Supp. 2008). Illinois
law categorizes wine-manufactures into different classes based on the number of gallons of
wine produced per year. Id.
109.
235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1(a) (2006 & Supp. 2008). Illinois manufacturers are
allowed to sell to out-of-state persons, allowed by law, and to in-state licensees, allowed by
law. Id. The provision for manufacturers to sell to out-of-state persons allows Illinois manufacturers to directly ship their product to out-of-state consumers that live in states with
friendly direct shipment laws. Id.
Illinois provides a wine-maker's premises license, which allows licensed wine
110.
manufactures to sell directly to consumers from their premises. 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1
(2006 & Supp. 2008). This exception also allows Illinois wineries the ability to ship to Illinois consumers. Id.An Illinois wine manufacture that is licensed in Illinois to manufacture
wine and concurrently holds a wine-maker's premises license has the ability to ship to Illinois consumers and out-of-state consumers in states with friendly direct shipment laws. Id.
111.
235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1(b) (2006).
112.
235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1(d) (2006 & Supp. 2008).
113.
Id.
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of Illinois retailers to ship their wares directly to Illinois consumers, Illinois
retailers are authorized to ship their products because of early jurisprudence
that defined a "sale" to take place at the retailer's location. 1 4 When consumers mail-order, phone in an order, or buy through a retailer's website,
the sale is legally complete at the location of the retailer or, in terms of the
Illinois statute, on the premises specified in the license." 5 This definition of
sale allows
Illinois wine retailers to sell and ship wine from their prem6
ises."
In 2007, the Illinois General Assembly created a winery's shipper license,"17 which enabled licensed out-of-state wineries to direct ship their
wines to Illinois consumers. 1 8 For a fee, out-of-state wineries are author114.
See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
115.
See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text. The Illinois General Assembly
gave deference to Illinois retailers' shipping privileges by adding the following text: "Nothing in this amendatory Act of the 95th General Assembly shall deny, limit, remove, or restrict the ability of a holder of a retailer's license to transfer, deliver, or ship alcoholic liquor
to the purchaser for use or consumption subject to any applicable local law or ordinance."
235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1(d) (2006 & Supp. 2008).
116.
By virtue of this definition, Illinois retailers can ship to both Illinois consumers
and out-of-state consumers in states with friendly direct shipment laws. See 235 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/5-1(d) (2006 & Supp. 2008).
117.
See Ill. Liquor Control Comm'n Indus. Educ. Div., Current List of Approved
Winery Shipper's Licenses (July 2, 2009), http://www.state.il.us/LCC/WineShipList.asp
(last visited Apr. 26, 2010) (listing all licensed wineries).
118.
235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-29 (2006 & Supp. 2008). Before June 1, 2008, Illinois
was a reciprocity jurisdiction. 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-29 (2006), amended by Act of Oct.
3, 2007, Pub. Act 95-634, 2007 Ill. Legis. Serv. 5803, 5815 (West). The prior Illinois law
did not discriminate between out-of-state wineries and out-of-state retailers. Id. Under the
previous Illinois law, "an adult resident or holder of an alcoholic beverage license in a state
which affords Illinois licensees or adult residents an equal reciprocal shipping privilege may
ship, for personal use and not for resale .. . to any adult resident of this State." Id. Out-ofstate retailers, having needed an alcoholic beverage license to sell in their home state, were
authorized under the previous law to ship to Illinois residents. Id.Interestingly, the Illinois
General Assembly repeatedly cites Granholm as one of the impetus for changing the law. In
the text of the statute, the General Assembly states their intent "[t]o authorize direct shipment of wine by an out-of-state maker of wine ... in conformance with the United States
Supreme Court decision decided on May 16, 2005 in Granholm v. Heald." 235 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/6-29(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2008). During the legislative debates on the floor of the
Illinois General Assembly, Illinois Senator Silverstein states that the new winery shipper's
license "is the result of two years of efforts to bring Illinois liquor law into compliance with
a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court ruling about wine called Granholm v. Heald." 95th Gen. Assem., Transcripts of the Illinois Senate Debates 1-49 (Aug. 7, 2007) (statement of Sen. Silverstein). The General Assembly's statement of intent is suspect because Granholm did not
invalidate reciprocity laws. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005). Instead, before the
passage of the Act of Oct. 3, 2007, in-state and out-of-state wineries and retailers were
authorized to ship to Illinois consumers. Under the new regulations, out-of-state retailers
were no longer authorized to ship to Illinois residents. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
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ized to ship up to twelve cases of wine per year directly to Illinois consumers of legal age."l9
Out-of-state retailers, however, having previously had the ability to
ship to Illinois consumers, are left out of the current law. Prior to June 1,
2008, out-of-state retailers had shipped to Illinois residents under the Illinois' reciprocity law; 120 the new law, however, repeals the reciprocity statute and substitutes a winery shipper's license. 121 The new Illinois law offers
no licenses to out-of-state retailers. 22 Because retailers must be licensed by
the Illinois Liquor Control Commission and the reciprocity law has been
repealed from the Illinois statutes, out-of-state retailers are no longer able to
ship to Illinois consumers.
B. NEW YORK AND MICHIGAN'S DIRECT SHIPMENT LAWS

Since Granholm v. Heald, Michigan and New York have modified
their direct shipment laws. Both Michigan and New York now allow instate and out-of-state wineries to ship to their residents. 23 Both of these
states have also adopted direct shipment laws that preclude out-of-state
retailers from shipping their products to consumers within their jurisdictions.1 24 Both Michigan and New York liquor laws function in a similar
manner as the new Illinois winery shipper's license.
1.

New York's Alcohol Scheme and Arnold Wines, Inc. v. Boyle

Like Illinois law, the New York Alcohol Beverage Control Law
("ABC Law") makes the sale of any alcoholic beverage illegal without first
obtaining a license from the New York liquor authority. 125 New York's
235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-29(b) (2006 & Supp. 2008).
119.
120.
Compare 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-29 (2006), amended by Act of Oct. 3, 2007,
Pub. Act 95-634, 2007 Ill. Legis. Serv. 5803 (West) (allowing a "holder of an alcoholic
beverage license" in reciprocal states to ship to Illinois residents), with 235 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/6-29 (2006 & Supp. 2008) (creating a shipping license for only wine manufacturers but not
distributers or retailers). See also 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1(d) (2006 & Supp. 2008).
235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-29 (2006 & Supp. 2008).
121.
122.
Nothing in the new law restricts an out-of-state retailer from opening a branch
within Illinois' jurisdiction. See 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1 to 12-4 (2006 & Supp. 2008).
An out-of-state retailer-willing to become an Illinois resident by opening a local branchwould then be able to ship directly to Illinois residents as an in-state retailer. See discussion
supra Part II.A.2. This option appears to have been exercised by at least one out-of-state
retailer. See supranote 75.
123.
See discussion infra Part Ifl.B. 1-2.
124.
See discussion infra Part lI.B. 1-2.
125.
N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CoNT. LAW § 100(1) (Gould 2007). This provision of the ABC
Law is akin to section 5/2-1 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes. Compare N.Y. ALCO. BEV.
CONT. LAW § 100(1) (Gould 2007) (disallowing manufacture or sale of alcohol without

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNI!VERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 30

ABC Law then establishes a three-tier system through which most incoming liquor is funneled. 126 The New York ABC Law also authorizes, through
licenses, both in-state wineries and out-of-state wineries to ship directly to
New York consumers. 27 New York ABC Law allows in-state retailers to
ship wine directly to consumers. 128 Out-of-state retailers are banned from
shipping to consumers within New York's
jurisdiction by virtue of the ban
29
on all direct shipments into the state. 1
In Arnold Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 130 the Southern District Court of New
York determined New York's ban on direct shipments from out-of-state
retailers to be constitutional. The court held that allowing in-state retailers
the ability to sell and ship within the New York jurisdiction was "an integral part of the three-tier system upheld by the Supreme Court.' 3' The
court reasoned that the licensing scheme was part of the three-tier system
that Granholm upheld as an "unquestionably legitimate" exercise of the
state's power under the Twenty-first Amendment. 32 Although the court
noted that New York's scheme required out-of-state retailers to become
residents of New York to ship to New York consumers, 33 the district court
concluded that excluding out-of-state retailers from New York's licensing
scheme was a necessary part of an effective three-tier scheme.134 Relying on
the "unquestionably legitimate" three-tier system, the court did not apply
the dormant Commerce Clause analysis laid out by the Supreme Court in
13 6
Granholm.13 On appeal, the circuit court affirmed.
obtaining the appropriate license), with 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1 (2006 & Supp. 2008)
(disallowing manufacture or sale without obtaining license from the Illiois Liquor Commission). This provision requires "all liquor sold, delivered, shipped, or transported to a New
York consumer first pass through an entity licensed by the State of New York." Arnold
Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Nance, supra note
32, at 936-39 (discussing New York's alcohol scheme).
126.
See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 1-164 (Gould 2007); see also Arnold
Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 403.
127.
See N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW § 79(c)-(d) (Gould 2007). These changes are
the result of the Granholm decision, which specifically held that New York could not allow
in-state wineries to ship directly to New York consumers while disallowing out-of-state
wineries the same advantage. See discussion supra Part II.C.
128.
N.Y. ALco. BEV. CoNT.LAW §§ 105(8)-(9) (Gould 2007).
129.
Id.§ 100.1; Nance, supra note 32, at 937.
130.
515 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
131.
Id.at 412.
132.
Id.at 411-14.
133.
Courts are very wary of statutes that require business operations to be performed
within the home state. See Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1039
(E.D. Mich. 2008) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
134.
Arnold Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 411-14.
135.
Id. at 412-14. The district court judge appears to have empathized with Justice
Thomas's dissent in Granholm. Id.at 413 ("Justice Thomas'[s] dissent possesses a certain
force of logic."). Although the district court judge may have disagreed with the majority
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Michigan'sAlcohol Scheme and Siesta Village Market, LLC v. Granholm

Like Illinois and New York law, the Michigan Liquor Control Code
("MLC Code") first enjoins the sale of alcohol without proper licensing
from the Michigan Liquor Control Commission. 137 From this starting point,
138
MLC Code creates a three-tier system for regulating the sale of alcohol.
In-state and out-of-state wineries occupy the first-tier as producers and generally must sell to distributors and wholesalers. 139 Michigan also offers instate retailers a license that designates the retailer as a "specially designated
merchant."' 140 As a "specially designated merchant," holders of the license
are entitled to direct ship wine to Michigan consumers.' 4' Out-of-state win-

eries are offered no licenses to ship under the Michigan scheme and must
become a resident
of Michigan by establishing a Michigan place of busi142
ness to do so.

In October 2008, the United States District Court of Michigan in Siesta Village Market, LLC v. Granholmt43 examined the Michigan statutory
scheme in light of Granholm. 44 The district court focused on the language
in the Granholm decision that stated requirements compelling business entities "to maintain residency [within] the home state ... to 'compete on equal
145
terms' with in-state businesses violate the [dormant] Commerce Clause."'
This court held the Michigan scheme to be unconstitutional because the
scheme required out-of-state retailers to establish residency within Michigan to compete with Michigan retailers. 146 The court determined that
Michigan had no legitimate local purpose to validate
the discriminatory
4
impact between in-state and out-of-state retailers."

opinion of Granholm, ignoring the dormant Commerce Clause analysis is not necessary to
determine the New York scheme to be constitutional. See discussion supra Part IV.
136.
Arnold Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 571
F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2009).
137.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1203 (2001 & Supp. 2009).
138.
Siesta Vill. MA., LLC, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1037; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS §§
436.1101-436.2303 (2001 & Supp. 2009).
139.
MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 436.1305,436.1403 (2001 & Supp. 2009). Michigan also
creates an exception for both in-state and out-of-state wineries to directly ship their wines to
Michigan consumers. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1113(9) (2001 & Supp. 2009).
140.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1537(1)(d) (2001 & Supp. 2009).
141.
Id.§436.1111(7).
142.
Siesta Viii. Mkct., LLC, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1037.
143.
Id. at 1035.
144.
Id.
145.
Id. at 1039-40 (citing Granhohn v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460,475 (2005)).
146.
Id.at 1040.
147.
Siesta Viii. Mkt., LLC, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1041.
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The Siesta Village Market, LLC and the Arnold Wines, Inc. holdings
are at odds with each other. The United States District Court in New York
held that New York was under no obligation to license or allow out-of-state
retailers to direct ship wine to New York consumers while allowing in-state
retailers to do the same. 48 In Michigan, the court ruled that Michigan officials could not prohibit out-of-state retailers from selling, delivering, and
shipping wine to Michigan consumers while allowing in-state retailers to do
the same. 149 The new Illinois law is designed to create the same disadvantage to out-of-state retailers while giving direct shipment privileges to instate retailers.150 When the new Illinois law is brought to court, the presiding judge will have to determine whether or not the Granholm decision
mandates Illinois allow out-of-state retailers to sell, deliver, and direct ship
their wines to Illinois consumers.
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Granholm v. Heald, the Supreme Court left a roadmap for the
courts to determine whether or not alcohol shipping laws are constitutional
under the dormant Commerce Clause. 5 ' As a threshold matter, the two
entities between which the state law allegedly discriminates must be deter1 52
mined to be "similarly situated" for dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
If the in-state and out-of-state entities are determined to be "similarly situated," the court will then determine whether the state law discriminates in
favor of the in-state entity over the out-of-state entities. 53 Section 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment will not save a discriminatory state law from being unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.154 Finally, a discriminatory state law will be saved if the state has a legitimate 5local
pur5
pose that cannot be accomplished in a nondiscriminatory manner.1
148.
Arnold Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401,413-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
149.
Siesta Viii. Mkt., LLC, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1045. The Fifth Circuit upheld a similar Texas provision. See Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Steen, 596 F.3d 249, 261 (5th Cir. 2010).
Texas law also licensed in-state retailers to ship to Texas residents but did not provide outof-state retailers the same ability on the same terms. Steen, 596 F.3d at 251. Although the
district court found the provision unconstitutional under Granholm, the Fifth Circuit reversed noting that "distinctions favoring in-state retailers are inherently part of the three-tier
system. Steen, 596 F.3d at 258.
150.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
151.
See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
152. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 863 (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278,
298-99 (1997)), rev'd sub nom. Siesta Viii. Mkt.., LLC v. Steen, 595 F.3d 249 (5th Cir.
2010).
153.
Id.
154.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 475.
155.
Id.at 489 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278
(1988)).
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Using this rubric, Illinois' new liquor law can be analyzed under the
dormant Commerce Clause in light of the Granholm decision. Similar
Michigan, New York, and Texas schemes have already experienced judicial
scrutiny. 56 The United States district court invalidated Michigan law by
comparing in-state and out-of-state retailers to determine a discriminatory
7
The courts upheld
scheme under a dormant Commerce Clause analysis.1
8
reasons.15
different
for
New York and Texas schemes
By examining the legal implications of the Illinois law on retailers and
wineries, the Illinois law can be evaluated for constitutionality under the
dormant Commerce Clause. This analysis will examine two sets of entities
that the Illinois liquor law impacts. First, in-state Illinois retailers will be
compared to out-of-state retailers under the Granholm analysis outlined
above. Next, in-state Illinois wineries will be compared with out-of-state
retailers under the same analysis.
A.

IN-STATE WINE RETAILERS V. OUT-OF-STATE WINE RETAILERS

The Illinois liquor law appears to be facially discriminatory as the law
allows in-state retailers to ship directly to Illinois consumers while disallowing out-of-state retailers to do the same. 5 9 Illinois' statutes are similar
to the two statutes in Granholm, which the Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause. 160 Both the New York
and Michigan statutes analyzed in Granholm allowed in-state wineries to
ship directly to in-state consumers while disallowing out-of-state wineries
from doing the same.' 6' The Illinois law similarly allows in-state retailers to
ship directly to Illinois consumers while disallowing out-of-state retailers
from doing the same;162 however, two federal district courts have reached
differing conclusions for different reasons. 63 Before the Illinois law can be
determined to be discriminatory and thereby unconstitutional, the role of
retailers in the three-tier system, the purpose and intent of the three-tier
156.
See Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848; Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F.
Supp. 2d 1035 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Arnold Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
157.
Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Siesta Viii. Mkt., LLC, 596 F.
Supp. 2d 1035.
Arnold Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 414.
158.
159.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
160.
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 475.
Id.
161.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
162.
Compare Siesta Viii. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (E.D.
163.
Mich. 2008) (overturning the discriminatory ban on shipping from out-of-state retailers),
with Arnold Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d 401 (upholding a similar discriminatory ban of
shipments from out-of-state retailers).
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system in the context of the Twenty-first Amendment, and the resulting
outcome of such a ruling must be examined.
1.

Illinois Retailers andOut-of-State Retailers Are "SimilarlySituated"
for Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis

Before any discriminatory legal scheme can be identified, the court
must determine whether entities, between whom the state supposedly discriminates, are similarly situated as a threshold matter.164 Entities are "similarly situated" if an "actual or prospective competition between the supposedly favored and disfavored entities in a single market" exists. 65 This
analysis turns on whether the entities being examined serve different marburden were removed," the entikets, and if the "supposedly discriminatory
66
ties would still serve separate markets.
Illinois and out-of-state retailers occupy the final tier in the three-tier
system. Illinois retailers are licensed to sell alcohol by obtaining alcohol
from wholesalers and distributors also licensed in Illinois under Illinois'
three-tier system. 67 Illinois retailers' products are subject to the two levels
of additional cost by entering the Illinois market through Illinois' wholesalers and distributors. 68 Similarly, out-of-state retailers occupy an analogous
position within their jurisdiction's three-tier system. 169 Out-of-state retail70
ers' products will have gone through the home state's three-tier system.'
Out-of-state retailers' products are subject to the two additional levels of
cost by entering the market through the wholesalers and distributors within
their jurisdictions.
2.

The Illinois Statutory Scheme Does Not DiscriminateAgainst Out-ofState Retailers

Although the Illinois law appears to be discriminatory, the Illinois
statutory scheme does not discriminate between in-state retailers and outof-state retailers because the scheme requires both to adhere to the Illinois
three-tier structure. Under the dormant Commerce Clause, a state law is
unconstitutional if the law mandates "differential treatment of in-state and
164.
Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 862 (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278,
298-99 (1997)), rev'd sub nom. Siesta Viii. Mkt.., LLC v. Steen, 595 F.3d 249 (5th Cir.
2010).
165.
Id.(quoting Tracy, 519 U.S. at 300).
166. Id.
167.
See discussion supra Part H.A.3.
168. See discussion supra Part H.A.3.
169.
See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
170.
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out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the
latter.' 7' In particular, the Supreme Court has struck down laws that create
additional costs by requiring the out-of-state entity to open a local branch
within the state's jurisdiction or impose a tax on alcohol produced out-ofstate while exempting in-state producers. 72 In Granholm, the Court asserted that "states cannot 'require an out-of-state firm to become a resident
in order to compete on equal terms'; 173 however, the Court174has repeatedly
held the three-tier system to be "unquestionably legitimate.'
Illinois' scheme can allow in-state retailers to ship to Illinois consumers because this is a legitimate exercise of the state's power under the
Twenty-first Amendment. In Granholm, the Court acknowledged that
"[s]tates may... assume direct control of liquor distribution through staterun outlets or funnel sales through the three-tier system."' 75 Illinois created
a three-tier alcohol distribution system pursuant to the Twenty-first
Amendment. 76 Illinois requires all Illinois retailers to be licensed and obtain their liquor through the three-tier system. 77 Illinois' licensing scheme
requires retailers be licensed,1 78 and by doing so, Illinois maintains control
and funnels alcohol sales through the three-tier system. Illinois has the
power to create exceptions that allow entities to circumvent Illinois' threetier system; 179 however, these exceptions must be administered without
discriminating against out-of-state entities. 80 Illinois is not required to
make exceptions for out-of-state entities to circumvent its three-tier system
when "similarly situated" in-state entities are not given the same exception.
Illinois law does not allow in-state retailers to circumvent the three-tier
system. Instead, all in-state retailers are direct shipping wine that has al-

Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v.
171.
Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
Id. at 476-77; Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984). In Bac172.
chus, Hawaii had enacted an excise tax on alcoholic beverages but exempted alcohol produced within Hawaii. Id. at 265. The Supreme Court rejected Hawaii's argument that the
exemption was a valid exercise of its power under the Twenty-first Amendment. Id. at 276.
Instead, the Court ruled that Hawaii's discrimination against out-of-state liquor producers
was a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and not saved by the Twenty-first
Amendment. Id.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 475 (quoting Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v.
173.
Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72 (1963)).
Id. at 475 (citing North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1986)).
174.
Id.at 489.
175.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
176.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
177.
See discussion supra Part IH.A.
178.
235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-29 (2009). The winery shipper's license is an example
179.
of such an exception. Id.
180.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 475; see also discussion supra Part II.C.
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ready passed through Illinois' three-tier system.18 ' Illinois is under no constitutional obligation to provide out-of-state retailers a license to sell liquor
to Illinois consumers and circumvent Illinois' three-tier system.
If the in-state wholesalers' place within the three-tier system were examined under the same rationale used in Siesta Village Market, LLC v.
Granholm, Illinois' Twenty-first Amendment interest in disallowing out-ofstate retailers from shipping to Illinois consumers becomes apparent. Under
the three-tier system, all alcohol sold within a state's jurisdiction is funneled through the state's three-tier system, with a few exceptions.,"
Wholesalers' purpose within the three-tier system is to provide alcohol to
retailers. 3 States are empowered to "require that all liquor sold for use in
the State be purchased from a licensed in-state wholesaler."' 8 4 For Illinois'
three-tier system to function properly, the State must have the ability to
mandate retailers buy from in-state wholesalers. Without this ability, the
State could not effectively funnel alcohol through its respective three-tier
system. In-state retailers must purchase their alcohol from in-state wholesalers. In-state wholesalers have the privilege of shipping their product to
in-state retailers. If out-of-state wholesalers could ship alcohol to in-state
retailers as in-state wholesalers do, the in-state retailer would circumvent
the three-tier distribution system in their state. Similarly, if out-of-state retailers were shipping to in-state consumers, consumers would then be circumventing the three-tier distribution system.' 8 5 Because wholesalers' position within the three-tier system is the sale of alcohol to retailers, 86 the
states exercise their legitimate state power by disallowing in-state retailers
from purchasing alcohol from an out-of-state wholesaler. Likewise, because
retailers' position within the three-tier system is the sale of alcohol to consumers, 8 7 the states exercise their legitimate state power by disallowing inSee discussion supra Part III.A.
181.
Siesta Viii. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (E.D. Mich. 2008)
182.
(invalidating MLC Code that allowed in-state retailer to directly ship to Michigan consumers
while disallowing out-of-state retailers to do the same).
See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
183.
North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1986) (Scalia, J., concur184.
ring). In North Dakota v. United States, the United States government challenged North
Dakota's regulation of liquor sold on Grand Forks Air Force Base and Minot Air Force
Base. Id. at 429-30; see also Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 110 n.10 (1980) ("The Twenty-First Amendment grants the States virtually
complete control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure
the liquor distribution system.").
This begs the question as to whether creating an exception for in-state wineries
185.
or producers-such as the winery shipper license-to circumvent the three-tier distribution
system intheir state creates a dormant Commerce Clause problem. See discussion infra Part
IV.B.
See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
186.
187.
See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
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state consumers from purchasing from out-of-state retailers. Without the
power to disallow in-state retailers from purchasing from an out-of-state
wholesaler, the state would not have the power to control the three-tier system within its jurisdiction. The legitimacy of the three-tier system, which is
"unquestionably legitimate,"' 88 would be defeated by allowing out-of-state
entities to circumvent the three-tier systems with which in-state entities
must comply.
Even though allowing out-of-state entities to circumvent Illinois'
three-tier system would erode the effectiveness of the three-tier system,
arguing that the Illinois scheme is discriminatory is attractive. The United
States District Court in the Eastern District of Michigan held that Michigan's scheme, which enjoined out-of-state retailers from shipping to Michigan consumers while allowing in-state retailers the same, to be discriminatory. 189 The Eastern District of Michigan focused on language from the
Supreme Court in the seminal case of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., which
states that the Supreme Court views "with particular suspicion state statutes
requiring business operations to be performed in the home State that could
more efficiently be performed elsewhere."' 190 This court misunderstands the
role of the three-tier system within the non-discriminatory mandate of the
dormant Commerce Clause. The three-tier system-by definition and necessity-burdens interstate commerce. 19 1 The entire alcohol industry would
benefit from fewer barriers, 192 but the Twenty-first Amendment gives states
the power to create a distribution scheme native to their jurisdiction.' 93 By
requiring alcohol entering its jurisdiction to pass through the three-tier system, each state adds its own burden to the system. The Pike analysis fails in
this case because the "unquestionably legitimate" three-tier system necessitates business operations to be performed in the home state.' 94 The mandate
of the dormant Commerce Clause and its interpretation in Granholm only
188.
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 475 (2005) (citing North Dakota v. United
States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1986)).
Siesta Viii. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
189.
Id. at 1039 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)); see
190.
also Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 06-11682-RWZ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
112074, at *24 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2008) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
142 (1970)), aft'd, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
191.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 ("States may assume direct control of liquor distribution through state-run outlets or funnel sales through the three-tier system.").
192.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
193.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
Because of the Twenty-first Amendment, statutes affecting the transportation of
194.
liquor have been haphazardly found be to be unconstitutional based on their burden to interstate commerce. See Baude v. Heath, 538 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2008) (invalidating an Indiana
requirement that out-of-state wineries not be licensed as a wholesaler in order to ship to
Indiana consumers). But see id. at 613 (upholding Indiana statute allowing face-to-face
requirement to ship to Indiana resident).
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requires the states to refrain from discriminating within the three-tier
framework. The Illinois and Michigan schemes do not discriminate because
neither scheme creates an exception for in-state or out-of-state retailers to
circumvent their three-tier systems.
This interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment comports with the
intentions of its authors. Prior to the adoption of both the Twenty-first and
the Eighteenth Amendments, residents within "dry" states would purchase
alcohol from neighboring "wet" states and thereby circumvent their local
state ordinances. 95 The Wilson Act of 1890 and the Webb-Kenyon Act of
1913 were passed by Congress specifically to redress the states' ability to
control alcohol flowing into their jurisdictions.196 The Supreme Court has
recognized that the language of Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment
incorporated the basic tenets of the Wilson Act of 1890 and the WebbKenyon Act of 1913.197 In Granholm, Justice Kennedy noted that the purpose of the Webb-Kenyon and Wilson Acts was to "allow States to maintain an effective and uniform system for controlling liquor by regulating its
transportation, importation, and use.' 98 Justice Kennedy further stated,
"States may also assume direct control of liquor distribution through staterun outlets or funnel sales through the three-tier system."' 199 By requiring
those states which allow in-state retailers to direct ship to also license outof-state retailers to do the same, the state's ability to funnel sales through
the three-tier system would be compromised. Requiring the states to license
out-of-state entities that can circumvent their three-tier systems is against
the intent of the Webb-Kenyon Act, Wilson Act, and the Twenty-first
Amendment.
By deciding the Illinois scheme not to be discriminatory, the legitimate
local purpose analysis need not be pursued.
B.

IN-STATE WINERIES V. OUT-OF-STATE WINE RETAILERS

Illinois liquor law allows an exception for Illinois wineries to circumvent the Illinois three-tier system but does not allow out-of-state retailers
the same access.20 0 When stated in this manner, Illinois law appears to dis20
criminate in the same manner as the statutes invalidated in Granholm; 1
195. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
196. See discussion supra Part I.A. 1; see also discussion supra Part II.C.
197. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 484 (2005) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976)); see also Nielson, supra note 85, at 753.
198.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484.
199. Id.
at 489.
200. See discussion supra Part III.A.
201.
Granholm invalidated Michigan and New York statutes that exempted in-state
wineries from the local three-tier system, while not allowing out-of-state wineries the same
exemption. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466.
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however, the same dormant Commerce Clause analysis must be done. First,
the two entities must be determined to be "similarly situated., 20 2 If the entities are "similarly situated," it must next be determined whether or not the
law is discriminatory. 203 If the law is determined to be discriminatory, the
Twenty-first Amendment will not2 save
it, 2°4 and only then will a finding of
5
a legitimate local purpose save it.
1.

Illinois Wineries and Out-of-State Retailers Are Not "SimilarlySituated"forDormant Commerce Clause Analysis

Because wineries' primary purpose is to produce alcohol rather than
sell directly to consumers like retailers, wineries and retailers are not "similarly situated" for dormant Commerce Clause purposes. At this stage in the
dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the court must determine whether "absent . . . legal barriers to entry, [the two entities] would be in competition., 20 6 Under the three-tier paradigm, wineries occupy the top along with
breweries, distillers, and rectifiers as producers or manufacturers. 20 7 Traditionally in the three-tier system, wineries sell their products to wholesalers
and distributers rather than directly to consumers. 20 8 Retailers occupy the
last tier in the three-tier system and, traditionally, sell alcohol to consumers. 2 09 Because wineries sell their products to wholesalers and distributors
rather than consumers, wineries do not compete in the same market as wine
retailers and are thereby not "similarly situated."
An exemption created for wineries, both in-state and out-of-state, to
sell directly to consumers does not make wineries similarly situated with
retailers. The Illinois liquor laws-along with the liquor laws of Michigan
and New York-allow wineries an exception to ship their products directly
to consumers.2t0 When selling alcohol to the same consumers, retailers and
wineries appear to serve the same market and thereby are similarly situated.
While retailers also sell wine to those same consumers, there are two reasons that wineries and retailers are not similarly situated. First, wineries are
only allowed to sell directly to consumers through an exception to the es202.
Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2010).
203.
Id. at 6 (citing Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99
(1994)).
204.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 487.
205.
Id. at 489 (citing New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278
(1988)).
206.
Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 863, rev'd sub noma. Siesta Vill. Mkt.., LLC v. Steen,
595 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2010).
See discussion supra Part Il.A.3.
207.
208.
See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
209.
See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
210.
See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
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tablished system rather than the established system from producer to distributor to retailers. Second, the exception helps wineries compete in a market which they otherwise would not have access.
Illinois and other jurisdictions are under no obligation to allow wineries an exemption from the three-tier system. Illinois-without discriminating between in-state and out-of-state wineries-can abrogate direct shipping of wine entirely.2t 1 Under those conditions, wineries would sell only to
wholesalers and distributors, and retailers would sell to consumers. In this
case, wineries and retailers would not be serving the same market as they
would not be selling to the same group.
The direct shipment exemption was created to help smaller wineries
compete in a market that would otherwise not be available.212 The United
States District Court in Massachusetts noted that the three-tier system "is
shaped like an hourglass, in that there are a large number of producers (the
top) and a large number of consumers (the bottom), but significantly fewer
wholesalers (the middle), and wholesalers generally prefer wineries offering a larger volume of wine. 21 3 Wineries producing approximately 30,000
gallons per year rarely have all of their wines represented by a wholesaler.214 Where smaller wineries are generally cut off from the market because wholesalers prefer to work with larger wineries, smaller wineries
cannot reach consumers like in-state retailers can. Even if smaller wineries
could find a wholesaler willing to distribute their wines, the wholesaler's
market could make distribution economically infeasible for smaller wineries. 215 Because the three-tier system creates barriers for wineries to reach
consumers that are easily reached by retailers, these two entities do not
compete in the same market and are thereby not similarly situated.
Because wineries and retailers are not "similarly situated," whether Illinois law discriminates between these two entities need not be analyzed.
V.

CONCLUSION

Granholm resolved whether Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment
abrogated the antidiscrimination mandate of the dormant Commerce
Clause. 2 16 In the five-to-four decision, Justice Kennedy clarified eighty

Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460,489 (2005).
211.
212. See id. at 468; Act of Aug. 31, 1994, cb. 394, § 3, 1994 Cal. Stat. 2249; Riekhof
& Sykuta, supra note 54, at 31.
213.
Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 06-11682-RWZ, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 112074, at *24 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2008), aff'd, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
Id.
214.
215.
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 468.
Id.at 486-88.
216.
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years of disparate jurisprudence on the subject.2 17 The Court decided laws
pursuant to the Twenty-first Amendment must still pass judicial scrutiny
under the antidiscrimination mandate of the dormant Commerce Clause.21 8
In its decision, the Supreme Court held that states could not indiscriminately abrogate the direct shipment abilities of in-state and out-of-state wineries. 2 19 The next court battle will be whether states have the ability to allow in-state retailers to direct ship to consumers within their jurisdiction
while disallowing their out-of-state counterparts from doing the same. By
choosing to omit out-of-state retailers from the licensing scheme,220 the new
Illinois scheme flirts with the boundaries of the powers granted to the states
by the Twenty-first Amendment. When the new law is reviewed, the court
will have to determine whether out-of-state retailers must be afforded the
same shipping advantages as in-state retailers.
Because the three-tier scheme is "unquestionably legitimate," the
states must be allowed to abrogate direct sales from out-of-state retailers
whether or not they allow in-state retailers the same advantage. Without this
control, the states' power to control and funnel alcohol through their native
three-tier distribution networks will be compromised. The new Illinois law,
which does not allow out-of-state wine retailers direct shipment privileges, 22 1 is a valid exercise of the Twenty-first Amendment. Rather than
attacking the constitutionality of the new Illinois law in court, Illinois oenophiles will have to go to the General Assembly if they want to receive direct
shipment of wines from out-of-state retailers.222
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